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Ann Brower 
New Zealanders have long treasured their land, with poets 
(Bracken, 1893) and prime ministers calling it ‘God’s Own 
Country’, or Godzone for short. On his visit to New Zealand 
in 1897 Mark Twain wrote: ‘The people are Scotch. They 
stopped here on their way from home to heaven – thinking 
they had arrived’ (Twain, 1897).
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inspired recommendations for land 
reform implementation which might 
avoid the current pitfalls.
Background of South Island high country 
land reform
Tenure review of pastoral leases started 
as a way to mediate a conflict over scarce 
land resources, in which some wanted the 
land for recreation, some for its aesthetic 
value, some for agriculture and some 
for subdivision (Brower, 2008, pp.34-5). 
In the 1980s New Zealand became a 
leader in a global trend towards market 
liberalisation. At the time, Crown-owned 
land was managed for multiple uses (such 
as timber, grazing, mining, recreation and 
wildlife), causing widespread discomfort. 
As the then director-general of the New 
Zealand Forest Service put it: ‘the highest 
attainable goal for managers [under 
multiple use] is a state of moderate 
dissatisfaction among all client groups’ 
(Kirkland, 1989). The fourth Labour 
government disbanded the two multiple-
use land management agencies of the 
day, the New Zealand Forest Service and 
the Department of Lands and Survey. It 
corporatised, then privatised, productive 
forest land and shifted indigenous forest 
As young as New Zealand is, conflicts 
about land and its uses have been fought 
about multiple values, only a few of 
which are tangible and locatable on a 
map. Land conflicts have arisen over 
sovereignty, cultural identity, and control 
of a resource located in, on or under 
land. Resources under contention have 
changed over time, from hectarage, to 
timber, to pasturage, to hard-rock and 
energy-producing minerals, to water. 
Recently, conflicts have started to feature 
a resource with new-found value in the 
New Zealand real estate market: beauty. 
In 2013 university student Daniel Kelly 
published a compelling ‘call to arms’ 
opinion piece describing New Zealand’s 
landscapes as an essential part of the 
Kiwi national identity. He wrote: ‘our 
rich abundance of natural beauty ... is 
our most celebrated asset. Fortunately 
it’s one [prime minister] John [Key] can’t 
sell’ (Kelly, 2013).
While the prime minister cannot sell 
beauty, the Crown can sell land. This 
article describes a contemporary and 
continuing conflict over the reform of 
land ownership in the beautiful South 
Island high country. I attempt to make 
sense of the outcomes of this land reform, 
suggesting that the source of the conflict 
lies more in ideas about ownership – 
especially John Locke-infused ideas of 
political economy – than in the raw 
economic value of the natural resources 
at stake. I conclude with some Locke-
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management to the new Department of 
Conservation.
These land reforms left out the 
Crown-owned pastoral leases of the 
South Island high country, 10% of the 
nation’s land mass, because this land ‘had 
an iconic value which would be more 
controversial politically’ (Brower, 2008, 
p.30, quoting the commissioner of Crown 
lands). Indeed, many groups had much 
to say about the high country. By the 
1980s the high country lessees themselves 
were advocating for the opportunity to 
purchase freehold title to the land they 
had leased, some for generations. Various 
Crown entities and boards of enquiry 
through the 1980s and 1990s pointed to 
the inefficiency of pastoral leases which 
prohibited land uses that could be more 
profitable than extensive pastoralism. 
At the same time, environmental and 
recreation groups were lobbying for 
more secure recreational access to high-
elevation land and for exclusion of sheep 
from that land (ibid., pp.31-3).
By the end of the 1980s interest 
groups that paid attention to the high 
country were all advocating for some 
sort of change. That said, there were 
few in the population at large who were 
paying attention to the high country. 
But it was rabbits which started the high 
country land reforms. The Rabbit and 
Land Management Task Force, set up in 
1987, responded to the rabbit plague of 
the 1980s by initiating a change of land 
tenure. In the late 1980s it reviewed the 
tenure of Mt Difficulty Station in Central 
Otago, with the goal of intensifying 
land use in the lowlands and relieving 
the highlands from grazing pressure. 
The land was split three ways: some was 
privatised, some retained for conservation 
as a protected natural area, and some 
remained in pastoral lease (Brower, 2008, 
pp.33-4). Thirty years later, oenophiles 
on both sides of the Tasman enjoy fine 
pinot noir from the Mt Difficulty and 
Roaring Meg labels produced on freehold 
land that came out of the review.
In 1991 the commissioner of Crown 
lands initiated a process called tenure 
review, in which a pastoral leaseholder 
could enter talks with the Crown to 
divide the lease land in a two-way split. 
The more productive land was privatised, 
in freehold title, while the land with 
conservation, recreation and landscape 
values shifted into the conservation estate. 
Tenure review proceeded ultra vires until 
Parliament passed the Crown Pastoral 
Land Act 1998 (ibid., pp.34-5). Almost 
everyone who was watching supported 
South Island land reform because each 
group stood to gain something: farmers 
received freehold title; conservationists 
saw sheep removed from hilltops and 
new parkland; and recreationists secured 
access to the backcountry for fishing, 
hunting and tramping.
South Island land reform on the ground
Tenure review affects 2.4 million hectares 
of land along the eastern slope of the main 
divide. This represents 10% of the nation’s 
land mass. It is an area slightly larger than 
Israel and just smaller than Belgium.
One affected property, Alphaburn, is 
on the south shore of Lake Wänaka, on 
the way to the Treble Cone ski field. Until 
2002 Alphaburn was 4,579 hectares of 
land owned by the Crown and leased for 
‘pastoral purposes only’. The leaseholder 
could run sheep and maybe deer, but the 
law clearly prohibited subdivision and 
industrial development. That prohibition 
on subdivision and development is 
precisely why the shorelines of the 
southern lakes – Wakatipu, Wänaka, 
Häwea, Tekapo, Pükaki – have remained 
so quiet during the day and so dark at 
night. In 2002, under tenure review, the 
Crown sold freehold title to 3,365 hectares 
of Alphaburn Station to the leaseholder 
for $265,500, or $79.50 per hectare. At 
the same time the Crown bought the 
leaseholder’s remaining leasehold rights 
to run sheep on the less productive, 
higher altitude land with conservation 
and recreation values. The Crown bought 
the pastoral rights to 1,214 hectares for 
$202,500, or $166.83 per hectare. After 
tenure review the Crown transferred 
those 1,214 hectares into a conservation 
reserve, and the former leaseholder 
subdivided the new freehold land, selling 
off 193 hectares for $10.1 million, or 658 
times the per-hectare price recently paid 
to the Crown. 
Alphaburn is just one of 110 reformed 
leases along the length of the Southern 
Alps. Between 1992 and late 2015 the 
Crown sold freehold rights to 370,981 
hectares of Crown-owned South Island 
high country land leased for pastoral sheep 
grazing. By law the Crown sells its rights 
to the land most ‘capable of economic use’ 
(Crown Pastoral Land Act 1998, section 
24(a)(2)): that is, the most productive 
land, usually at lower elevation and often 
on lakeshores or along roadways. Former 
leaseholders paid the Crown $65.2 
million for freehold title, or an average of 
$176 per hectare (median of $77). At the 
same time, the Crown bought pastoral 
leasehold rights to 330,854 hectares of 
land for conservation reserves. By law, 
the land to which the Crown buys rights 
is the land with recognised conservation 
and recreation values, which is usually the 
least productive, steeper, higher and more 
remote land. The Crown paid leaseholders 
$116.8 million for this land, or an average 
of $353 per hectare (median of $278).
Two things are of note here. First, on 
net, the Crown has paid high country 
farmers considerably more than the 
farmers have paid the Crown, although 
the resources and rights the Crown sold 
appear far more valuable than those 
it bought. This is illustrated in Table 
1. Former leaseholders have received 
freehold title to 371,000 hectares and 
nearly $52 million on net in exchange 
By law the Crown sells its rights to the 
land most ‘capable of economic use’ 
... that is, the most productive land, 
usually at lower elevation and often on 
lakeshores or along roadways.
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for giving up grazing rights to 331,000 
hectares of the least productive land. In 
the exchange, the Crown sold, and the 
leaseholder bought, residual freehold 
rights not included in the leasehold 
agreement. So, all the previously 
prohibited land uses become possible 
(subject to the Resource Management Act 
1991 and the relevant district plan). The 
Crown bought leasehold rights of grazing 
and occupation, which it then retired to 
create conservation parks or reserves. 
At the outset of tenure review the 
Treasury set a rough guideline for 
comparing the value of what the Crown 
was selling against what it was buying. 
According to Treasury, the pastoral 
rights were worth about 72% of the 
freehold rights sold by the Crown to 
the runholders. So, when exchanging 
rights the Crown should be willing to 
pay about 72% of what the runholders 
would pay for freehold. Thus the ratio 
of per-hectare prices (price paid by 
the Crown for pastoral rights/price 
paid by runholder for freehold) should 
vary around a median of 0.72 (Brower, 
Meguire and Monks, 2010, citing Treasury 
documents). Empirical economics of 
rural land prices in New Zealand suggests 
that the ratio should be lower (Stillman, 
2005). Yet the median ratio, thus far, is 
3.4. The ratio at Alphaburn was 2.1, and 
it has gone as high as 940.0, at Shirlmar. 
Of 110 deals to date, only 19 have a ratio 
of less than 1.0; 11 of those anomolous 
19 were negotiated before 1998. 
The second thing of note is the fate 
of the former Crown land once freehold. 
As of mid-2015, almost a third of the 
new freeholders had subdivided and on-
sold some land. 74,000 hectares – about 
a fifth of what the Crown sold for $65 
million – has since sold for $275 million. 
On average, those who have on-sold land 
have done so at 693 times the Crown’s 
selling price. This is illustrated in Table 2. 
In other words, at only 65,700% of the 
purchase price, the capital gains realised 
at Alphaburn are decidedly below the 
median of 69,200%. 
Understanding land reform outcomes
It is often easy, if a bit trite, to explain 
the outcomes of land conflicts by citing 
larger-than-life personalities or policy 
style. On the face of it, South Island land 
reform outcomes resist both of these 
possible explanations. Twenty-three years 
after its inception the policy has outlasted 
many changes of government and all the 
dominant personalities involved. 
Another logically easy, but rather 
unlikely, explanation is corruption, graft 
or electoral influence. New Zealand is 
regularly perceived as one of the least 
corrupt nations in the world, according 
to Transparency International surveys, 
rendering the first two unlikely. The third 
is also unlikely, given that there are only 
304 leaseholding families directly affected 
by, or benefiting from, land reform. Land 
Table 1: The 12 largest Crown payouts to former pastoral leaseholders in 110 tenure reviews 
from 1992 to 2014
Name of lease
Area to 
conserva-
tion (ha)
Area to 
freehold 
(ha)
$ paid by 
Crown for 
conservation 
land
$ paid by 
lessee for 
freehold 
Year 
tenure 
review 
comp-
leted net to lessee
Dingleburn 17,722 7,016 6,192,500 615,000 2004 $5,577,500
Mesopotamia 20,728 4,973 4,742,000 142,000 2009 $4,600,000
Braemar 13,386 1753 2,718,381 81,381 2012 $2,637,000
Kyeburn 4,703 1,852 2,875,000 375,000 2009 $2,500,000
Lake Häwea 4,855 6,470 2,200,000 $0 2011 $2,200,000
Allandale 4,421 124 1,890,000 10,000 2012 $1,880,000
Mt Cook 1,546 1,005 1,956,000 156,000 2009 $1,800,000
Mt Potts 8,670 1,022 1,820,000 130,000 2009 $1,690,000
Mt Aspiring 8,017 2,309 2,047,500 437,500 2012 $1,610,000
Lauder 3,020 1,205 4,000,000  2,560,000 2013 $1,440,000
Barrosa 4,840 968 1,610,000 180,000 2010 $1,430,000
Mt Cecil 1,265 1,188 1,410,000 $0 2011 $1,410,000
Source: these data were gleaned from successive Official Information Act requests to LINZ
Table 2: What happens to land once privatised? The 12 largest gross revenues from 
subdivision and on-selling of land from former Crown pastoral leases
Lease
Year tenure 
review 
completed
Gross on-selling 
revenue
Land area 
later on-
sold (ha)
Price per 
ha paid to 
Crown by 
runholder 
for freehold
Average price per ha 
paid by new buyers 
Hillend 1998  $26,200,000 2671 $126 $9,800
Queensberry 
Hills 1998  $15,148,000 1950 $66 $7,800
Wyuna 2004  $14,185,000 8.8 $543 $1,611,900
Closeburn 1998  $14,182,000 7.7 $215 $1,841,800
Glenariffe 2004  $12,074,000 1664 $157 $7,300
Waiorau 1998  $10,350,000 2561 $72 $4,000
Avalon 1998  $10,200,000 1351 $99 $7,600
Alphaburn 2002  $10,100,000 193 $80 $52,300
Cattle Flat 
(Otago) 2005  $8,480,000 1780 $132 $4,800
Shirlmar 2003  $8,350,000 3498 $2 $2,400
Waitiri 2002  $8,200,000 5.5 $91 $1,490,900
Spotts Creek 1998  $8,200,000 3108 $85 $2,600
Source: These data were gleaned from land sales records recorded in QuickMap-SalesView software. What was once 110 pastoral 
leases is now over 3,000 parcels of freehold. Thus, discerning which former pastoral land has on-sold for how much required 
examining the sales records for each of 3,000 parcels of former Crown land in the high country. Data collection ended in May 2015; 
no sales after May 2015 were recorded. It is worth noting that there are some sales missing from the software. As such, these data 
might underestimate but will not overestimate the on-selling revenues.
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reform outcomes appear, rather, to be a 
series of micro-battles which render the 
conservation lobby powerless to fight the 
macro-war over the beauty of the South 
Island (Brower, 2008, pp.54-9). 
Olson’s (1965) logic of collective 
action predicts that those with a 
vested (that is, financial) interest in 
resource conflicts will show superior 
organisation and persistence, and often 
defeat more numerous opponents with 
a non-financial interest. High country 
leaseholders have a strong financial 
incentive for land reform, and collective 
action creates a playing field that is tilted 
in their favour from the start. However, 
several aspects of land tenure reform 
render the tilt even steeper. Perhaps most 
powerful is the devolution of the tenure 
review process and its case-by-case 
decision-making. Land reform outcomes 
are decided one by one, which tends to 
contain the scope of debate and keep 
it off the national radar (Pralle, 2006, 
p.29). This tends to favour the status quo 
(Schattschneider, 1960), which remains 
Olson’s victory of the few with the 
vested interest over the many with the 
public interest. The local, particularistic 
policy style of tenure review is one which 
also tends to privilege local needs over 
national goals (Pralle, 2006, pp.207–9). 
Though seeming personal and friendly, 
case-by-case decision-making in fact 
makes it prohibitively expensive for 
dispersed national conservation interest 
groups such as Forest and Bird, Fish and 
Game and the Environmental Defence 
Society to scrutinise and challenge each 
land reform proposal. Hence, many 
sail through unchallenged and even 
unnoticed. 
Land reform deals are negotiated by 
Crown contractors, who are instructed 
by their public service employers to be 
neutral: to avoid taking sides and not 
advocate for the Crown’s interest (Brower, 
2006; Brower, Meguire and Monks, 2010). 
Neutrality appears to have arisen from 
two seemingly innocuous sources. First, 
in the neo-liberal public sector reforms 
of the 1980s there was a desire to adhere 
to the policy/operations split, in which 
public service operatives are to be entirely 
separate from, and untainted by, political 
and policy decisions (Boston et al., 1991, 
pp.258-9). Proponents of the split and 
its intellectual predecessor, the politics/
administration dichotomy (Wilson, 
1887), assume that a politically neutral 
and autonomous administrative branch 
of government will deliver unbiased 
results (Brower, 2006). Second, the 
contractors have the task of consulting 
with interested parties, not negotiating 
and not advocating for the Crown. 
Consultation involves a ‘proposal not 
yet finally decided upon; … keeping an 
open mind and being ready to change 
and even start again’ (Queenstown Lakes 
District Council, undated). This has been 
interpreted as a prohibition on stating a 
desired outcome for conservation and for 
the New Zealand public (Brower, 2006, 
pp.76-86).
The problem is that, as the holder of 
the residual ownership interest in the land 
it is selling, the Crown itself is an interested 
party. Hence, the Crown avoiding taking 
sides did not avoid allowing one side to 
dominate. When the Crown refused to 
take sides in its own two-party negotiation, 
it ceded its power from the start. It thus 
risked devaluing its own financial interest 
and selling the public short. The financial 
outcomes of tenure review suggest that 
apolitical administration has not avoided 
farmer dominance; indeed, it may have 
facilitated it.
Further, any time a government 
contracts out a job, it is prudent to 
examine the terms of the contract to 
discern the incentives operating on the 
contractor. A principal–agent problem 
(Niskanen, 1971) occurs when the 
agent ignores or subverts the principal’s 
goals because their motivations are at 
odds (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; 
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987; 
Ricketts, 2002, ch.5; Waterman and Meier, 
1998; Mueller, 2003). Several features of 
the contractual arrangements for Crown 
land reform negotiators suggest there 
might be a principal-agent problem.
1. The Crown is represented by 
contractors hired by Land 
Information New Zealand (LINZ) 
and employed by a property 
management, development and 
valuation firm (including, but 
not limited to, DTZ, Opus and 
Quotable Value). These contractors 
answer to LINZ officials.
2. Contractors are not paid 
on commission, but by pre-
arranged contractual sums for 
administrative progress towards 
the ultimate goal (a signed land 
reform deal). Hence, the Crown 
neither rewards a contractor for 
striking a cheap deal, nor penalises 
them for an expensive deal. More 
tellingly, the Crown does not set 
a reserve price from which the 
contractors negotiate.
3. Until August 2006 tenure review 
outcomes were confidential, giving 
rise to asymmetric information. 
Only LINZ and the contractors 
knew who paid whom how much 
in a given deal.
Agency theory predicts that when 
agents are instructed to do X, but are 
financially rewarded when they do Y, 
they often do Y. This is especially true in 
conditions of asymmetric information, 
when it is difficult to ascertain which of 
X or Y (or Z, for that matter) the agent is 
performing. In land reform, the ministerial 
principal directs the agents to: 1) complete 
tenure review deals; and 2) get a ‘fair 
financial return for the Crown’ (Cabinet 
Policy Committee, 2003, 2005). But, until 
August 2006, not even the minister knew 
if they were fulfilling the second directive. 
In short, land reform implementation had 
serious structural problems. 
2007 reforms and thereafter
In 2007 an optimistic Labour-led 
government radically changed the rules of 
Agency theory predicts that when agents 
are instructed to do X, but are financially 
rewarded when they do Y, they often do Y.
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land reform (Cabinet Business Committee, 
2007, paragraphs 22-3) in an attempt to 
address many of these problems (see Table 
3). In July 2009 the newly-elected National-
led government rescinded outright the 
landscape and biodiversity rule changes 
described in Table 3, but left intact the 
ministerial budgetary authority and 
information transparency clauses (Cabinet 
Policy Committee, 2009, paragraphs 
15-20). If the only problems with land 
reform were structural, and if a National-
led government in a recession were more 
careful with expenditures than a Labour-
led government running a surplus, then we 
would expect land reform outcomes under 
National after the rule changes to be less 
costly to the taxpayer. But they are not. Since 
2007 the Crown has trebled the median 
price it pays per hectare to buy leasehold 
rights to land shifting to conservation, 
while the leaseholders’ median per hectare 
has only doubled. So fixing the problems 
and the election of a purportedly more 
cost-conscious government have resulted 
in the Crown losing more money, not less. 
This is at odds with both the lefty-greenie 
and the hard-nosed neo-liberal policy 
styles for which New Zealand is known. 
Redrawing lines on the land reform playing 
field has not changed the outcomes. There 
must be something else going on.
Looking deeper: the Lockean political 
economy driver
The image of a man and his dog 
battling against the odds in the empty, 
unforgiving, but hauntingly beautiful 
landscape of the Southern Alps tugs at the 
cultural heartstrings. Such imagery can be 
heartwarming. In the South Island high 
country it has become associated with the 
idea that ownership of land is established 
by the hard work and gritty determination 
of the occupier. 
This idea of ownership originates 
in John Locke’s (1694) labour theory 
of property. It is a colonial and nation-
building idea of property, which served 
the interests of young nations and colonies 
by providing incentive to colonise and 
conquer, and motivating development of 
natural resources (Bromley, 2000, p.20). 
Locke’s idea is plainly evident in the 
United States’ Homestead Act (1862) and 
the General Mining Act (1872), which 
promised freehold title as a reward for 
making economic use of a piece of the 
West. It is notably absent, however, in 
the New Zealand Land Act 1948, which 
expressly prohibits the transfer of freehold 
(section 66). This reluctance to grant 
freehold title long predates the Land Act, 
and stems from the fragility and erosive 
nature of the high country soils (Page, 
2009, pp.409-11). Yet it appears that land 
reform is progressing as if the Land Act 
employed Locke’s ideas of ownership.
In politics, interest groups promote 
a world view which serves their goals, 
be they political or financial, publicly 
or privately motivated. In land reform, 
the farming interest has promoted a 
Lockean idea of ownership that does 
not conform to today’s laws, but does 
conform to heartwarming and patriotic 
imagery, in which long-term occupation 
and labour are considered as good as 
freehold. Runholders have often implied 
that the land they farm is theirs: that they 
own it. Leasehold areas are seldom called 
‘pastoral leases’; runholders are quoted 
in the media describing leasehold land 
as ‘their land’ (Fencepost, 2006), ‘their 
properties’ (Scott, 2004), ‘their pastoral 
lands’ (Bruce, 2005), ‘our properties’ 
(Rae, 2004) and ‘their high country land 
in perpetuity, signed by the Crown in 
1948’ (ODT Staff, 2006). 
According to the terms of the pastoral 
leases, set out in the Land Act 1948 and 
reaffirmed in the Crown Pastoral Land 
Act 1998, the leaseholders do have an 
ownership interest in the land under 
lease. That interest is long in tenure (33 
years, perpetually renewable) and strong 
in nature (compensable if revoked). 
But it is very narrow in the land uses 
it allows (only extensive pastoralism, 
no subdivision or industrial use). The 
Crown explicitly retained all freehold 
rights and rights to the soil, in both 1948 
and 1998. In other words, the idea of 
work-to-own died with the 19th century. 
The Land Act 1948 gave license to the 
runholders to make economic use out of 
the harsh landscapes of the high country. 
It also gave runholders ownership rights 
to that use and the improvements they 
created. But the Land Act made a special 
point to retain the Crown’s ownership 
of the land itself. In 1948 the pastoral 
use rights were worth more than the 
land itself. But times have changed. As 
Table 2 illustrates, the land itself is now 
Table 3: Perceived policy failures and proposed solutions
Perceived policy failures 
highlighted in 2006–07 Policy fixes proposed in 2007 
Overly generous Crown 
payouts
Remove budgetary authority from officials and restore it into 
the minister’s hand. If someone spends too much money in 
the future, it will be the minister, not bureaucrats, and not 
contractors.
Principal–agent problem  
in which officials ignore 
ministerial pleas to get a 
‘fair financial return for the 
Crown’
Enhance ministerial oversight of budgetary and conservation 
aspects of proposed tenure review deals. Remind officials 
that, in order for a deal to proceed, it must benefit the Crown.
Landscape carve-up
Institute a standard by which significant landscape values 
should not be compromised in any way, which all future deals 
must meet before they may proceed. If a station lies within 
five kilometres of a lake, the proposed deal must contain 
provisions to prevent subdivision or significant alteration of 
the lakeshore.
Detrimental effects 
on threatened native 
biodiversity
Institute a standard by which significant biodiversity values 
should not be compromised in any way, which all future deals 
must meet before they may proceed. This does not appear 
to include species, populations or ecosystems that would be 
impractical or unrealistic for the Department of Conservation 
to maintain.
Source: Brower, 2008, p.150
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worth on average 693 times the value of 
pastoral use rights. 
In tenure review, the Crown appears 
to be ignoring or under-valuing the 
economic potential of the land itself, 
once the pastoral constraints of the Land 
Act are lifted. Examining the valuation 
reports for all deals from 1998 to 2008 
reveals that most ignored the value of the 
option to vary land use. But there are four 
cases in which Crown valuers took note 
of the value of subdivision and other uses 
(Brower, Meguire and Departe, 2012). 
One of the four is Alphaburn, where the 
Crown’s valuer estimated that the option 
to subdivide or otherwise change land 
on the shore of Lake Wänaka was worth 
about $3 million. In negotiations, the 
Crown then sold those freehold rights for 
$267,500; the former runholder then on-
sold 6% (193 hectares) for $10.1 million. 
This discussion of who owns the 
value of the land itself brings us back to 
where we started: the role of beauty. The 
arresting beauty of the high country feeds 
a romanticised imagery of the Southern 
Man. This in turn fuels a do-it-yourself, 
work-to-own concept of property that is 
squarely at odds with the Land Act 1948 
and the Crown Pastoral Land Act 1998. 
The pattern of prices in the land reform 
outcomes suggests that, regardless of the 
structure of the contracts and incentives 
operating on Crown negotiators, the 
harsh beauty, romantic imagery and 
Lockean ideas of property prevail. Herein 
lies the irony of the high country story. 
Adherence to the image of the Southern 
Man is transforming the landscapes 
that constructed the man himself. The 
dominance of the antiquated American 
model of acquiring freehold title by dint 
of hard work is destroying the physical, 
cultural and aesthetic substrate of the 
Southern Man. Clinging to the romance 
attached to the landscape is subsidising 
the destruction of the landscape itself.
Conclusion
One could call land conflict a ‘wicked 
problem’ (Horst, Rittel and Webber, 1973), 
but I would call it a problem of meaning. 
Land is important to many people for 
many reasons. Many individuals and 
groups assign different meanings to the 
same landscape, geological feature or 
hectare. As such, conflicts over land often 
relate more to identity, aesthetics, heritage 
or competing visions for the world than to 
the measurable dollar value of land itself. 
In such cases, it is less about dollars than 
about meaning. 
When a conflict over land becomes 
about meaning, seemingly absurd 
financial outcomes almost make sense if 
all sides agree to subscribe to the same 
meaning. In the case of tenure review, 
the high country farmers succeeded 
in assigning a Lockean work-to-own 
meaning to high country land and the 
Crown seems to have accepted it. This 
mutual acceptance of a Lockean view 
of ownership runs counter to the text 
of the governing statutes and resembles 
hegemony (Brower, 2008, pp.19-25, 37-
74). 
There are several ways in which tenure 
review could have been implemented 
differently, and in a way more obviously 
beneficial to the New Zealand public. This 
article concludes with a few suggestions 
for how the Crown might simultaneously 
generate revenue, allow for land use 
diversification on productive land, 
protect conservation values, and provide 
universal recreation access to land with 
‘significant inherent values’.
Involve the courts
When policy is unclear, let the courts 
decide. Perhaps the simplest option, this 
would maintain the current mechanism 
of redistributing property rights, but 
change the administrative arrangements. 
Currently, the redistribution and 
determination of equalisation payments 
take place in a process of consultation 
between LINZ contractors and the lessee, 
the Department of Conservation, iwi 
and other interested parties. LINZ is 
simultaneously a negotiating party with a 
vested interest and the referee in charge of 
the process. This option would place the 
judiciary, rather than LINZ, in the role 
of referee in charge, thus relieving LINZ 
of the conflicting roles of representing 
the Crown’s interest while administering 
the process itself. It could make use of 
the Environment Court for this. The 
role of the court would be to determine 
the relative value of potential and actual 
property rights, rather than leaving this to 
the negotiating powers of runholders and 
LINZ. 
Buy and sell
The Crown could buy the entire lease. 
Following the purchase, the government 
could identify the significant inherent 
values worthy of protection through a 
consultation process similar to tenure 
review. As the government would be the 
holder of the complete bundle of property 
rights, identification of protected land 
would not be constrained by the lessee’s 
interest. After reserving some land for 
the Department of Conservation, the 
government could sell the remaining 
land ‘capable of economic use’ at auction. 
This would allow a market mechanism 
to determine the value of potential and 
actual property rights, rather than a 
private negotiation administered by LINZ. 
It would also increase the likelihood of 
the Crown capturing potential value from 
the assets it is disposing of. Though the 
initial cash outlay for the whole property 
purchase would be high, Table 2 suggests 
that the revenues generated at auction 
would be higher. Administrative costs 
would be much lower than currently.
Create reserves and amend the Land Act
The Land Act 1948 gives ministers and 
the governor-general authority to create 
reserves on land under pastoral lease. 
Hence, the government could create 
reserves on land sections with desired 
values, and create access easements across 
the pastoral land surrounding the reserves. 
The Land Act does not explicitly require 
compensation to the lessee for creation 
of the reserves themselves, but posterity 
might require compensation for any value 
lost due to the easements or exclusion of 
sheep from the reserves. At the same time, 
Parliament could amend the Land Act to 
allow more uses on pastoral land – from 
viticulture to ski fields to golf courses 
– as desired by parliamentarians and as 
permitted by the Commissioner and the 
Resource Management Act. This option 
would not allow for any freeholding, 
and would likewise not extinguish the 
lease over land designated as reserves. 
But it would allow for protection of 
values, recreation access and land use 
diversification. The cost would be 
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administrative and any compensation 
owed to the lessee. Ideally, that 
compensation would be determined by a 
court such as the Land Valuation Tribunal. 
Buy some and amend
The government could buy the lessee’s 
interest in land deemed to be of 
conservation, recreation or heritage value, 
and thus regain ‘full Crown ownership’ 
of land going into the conservation 
estate. As a condition of the government 
purchasing the lessee’s use rights, the 
government could amend and relax the 
Land Act’s pastoral requirement, allowing 
for diversification but no subdivision. 
This would not allow a freehold option, 
but would convey many of the property 
rights associated with freehold, and many 
of the rights in the non-pastoral bundle 
desired by lessees. 
These are just a few options, briefly 
presented. Each would have proponents 
and opponents, and costs and benefits. 
It is not an exhaustive list, but merely 
suggests that there are alternatives. 
Redistribution and exchange of 
property rights can be tools for several 
ends related to land tenure and the 
multiple-use paradigm: clarity of 
tenure; neat separation of resource uses; 
diversification of land use; and clear 
conservation mandate on conservation 
land. This article asked how the process 
is going in New Zealand, in light of an 
abstract view of property. The results of 
land tenure review are clear. Redistribution 
of property rights is certainly changing 
land uses. Who profits from the changing 
land use is a different question entirely.
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